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FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND FLEXIBLE
REGULATION: DESTABILIZING THE
REGULATORY STATE
BY CRISTIE FORD*
Cristie Ford examines the regulatory failures leading up to the
financial crisis, the rise of 'flexible regulation, " the effects offinancial
innovation on regulation, and three different case studies that
illuminate the drastic effects of that innovation: the Basel II banking
regulations, the Canadian Asset-Backed Commercial Paper market, and
the process for writing the Volcker Rule. Finally, Ford examines the
underlying assumptions that should be re-examined in order to create
more effective regulatory policies.
I write in the fields of securities and financial regulation, but I
am primarily a scholar of regulation and governance. For the last few
years I have been trying to take stock of the zeitgeist not only in
finance, but also in regulation.
I do not let financial institutions off the hook for their own
egregiously bad conduct in the era leading up to the financial crisis, and
I do not mean to underplay the direct causal link between that poor
conduct and the crisis itself. However, my focus here is on the
regulatory failures and gaps that also existed in the time leading up to
the financial crisis. In our post-mortem analyses of pre-crisis regulation,
there has been a lot of talk about the impact of market fundamentalism
on financial regulation; about overreliance on the efficient market
theory; and about excessive adherence to Hayekian political
philosophy,' which asserts that information is always decentralized and
therefore no central regulator (unless it is part of a totalitarian state)
could possibly have enough information to actually regulate well. I
think all of these are important factors, which materially contributed to
substantial deregulation both nationally and internationally in the lead-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of British Columbia.
1. see FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) (arguing that adherence to
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up to the crisis. Along with these factors, those years also saw
regulators bend to intense pressure to reduce the so-called "regulatory
burden" in light of transnational competition for capital markets
business. David Skeel's argument that financial regulation in this era
was corporatist - that it was premised on a problematic sort of elite
partnership between government and financial institutions - is also
persuasive.2
Yet some of the things that were wrong with regulation, roughly
between the fall of Enron in 2002 and the height of the financial crisis
in fall 2008, were also of a different nature. I think it is clear that market
fundamentalism, regulatory competition and neo-Hayekian thinking
contributed to an erosion of regulation, but there were also a lot of
progressive, non-Hayekian regulatory scholars who were advocating
new forms of regulation in this era. Generally speaking, their
prescriptions also accorded substantially more freedom to private actors
than had been the case previously. I want to think about why that was
the case.
Scholarship on regulation and governance exploded, and
changed, starting in the early 1990s. This was the post-Thatcher, post-
Reagan era of Al Gore's Reinventing Government initiative, Tony
Blair's Third Way, and important new scholarly contributions like Ian
Ayres's and John Braithwaite's 1992 book, Responsive Regulation.3 An
increasingly sophisticated regulatory tool kit emerged transnationally,
which continued to evolve through the early years of this millennium
and which evolves today. In securities regulation, the conversation took
the form of a debate about the relative merits of "rules based" and
"principles based" regulatory strategies. In the United States, there was
a lot of interest in the distinction following the fall of Enron (sometimes
blamed on overly bright line, rules-based accounting standards) and the
rise of London as a financial center (sometimes attributed to its more
principles-based regulatory approach). The rules-versus-principles
conversation, along with a separate conversation about corporate social
responsibility and ways to enlist corporate actors into the service of
broader social norms, can be understood as contextual examples of a
2. DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2010).
3. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).
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broader trend in scholarship and policy making toward what I call
"flexible regulation."
Regulatory scholarship is a big tent. At the same time, a move
toward more flexible regulation has been discernible across topic areas
over the last two decades or so. Flexible regulation comes in different
varieties too, but one commonality is a new emphasis on regulatory
sensitivity to, and tailoring to, context. The idea is that it is possible to
move away from one-size-fits-all, prescriptive regulation toward an
approach that is more context sensitive, pragmatic, and data-driven.
Flexible regulation also aims to be better at recognizing and leveraging
other compliance-enhancing forces in society. It treats different
regulated entities differently: it collaborates with private actors where
possible and accords them a great deal of freedom to comply with
regulatory goals as they see fit, but it ratchets up the oversight on non-
cooperative actors. It pulls in non-state actors. It tends to accept that
state regulators do not always have the same access to or quality of
information as regulated actors, which is one reason that it tries to "steer
not row" or (using another phrase) to "regulate at a distance." It tends to
be permeable and interactive, not top-down and directive. As a result,
the idea is that flexible regulation can reach out to and incorporate
community norms, individual morality, market forces, market or media
pressure, and any other forces that can help strengthen the arm of
regulation.
In addition, I would argue that flexible regulation is
characterized by a notion that regulation ought to be dynamic and
iterative. The idea is that regulation should be able to learn from its own
experience, and modify its own behavior in light of that learning. Under
the broad flexible regulation umbrella are some approaches, like meta-
regulation, management-based regulation, or safety case regulation, that
especially embrace contingency and a leaming-by-doing approach.
Meta-regulation is the term used by Christine Parker, an Australian
scholar, to describe her "triple loop learning" approach to corporate
governance and corporate social responsibility. 4 Management-based
regulation is David Lazer's and Cary Coglianese's term to describe a
similar approach across several regulatory sectors in the United States,
which "directs regulated organizations to engage in a planning process
4. CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: SELF-REGULATION & CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP (2000).
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that aims toward the achievement of public goals, offering firms
flexibility in how they achieve public goals."s Some of the work I have
done on principles-based securities regulation is probably analogous. 6
The claim is that, rather than trying to manage the details in a particular
regulated entity, regulators should be able to approach their task at a
systems level. Compliance systems and industry conditions are in a
constant state of flux, so the trick for regulators is to focus on the meta-
level - on how well regulated entities manage themselves, learn from
experience, and respond to new challenges. This focus also frees the
regulator from having to worry about the compliance details within any
particular regulated entity, though the regulator will still have to be able
to make good judgments at the meta-level. Christine Parker calls this
the "regulation of self-regulation." 7
For example, a financial regulator should be able to assess the
quality of the internal compliance and risk management mechanisms
that a financial institution has in place. The regulator would assess
whether or not the firm has in place effective policies and procedures to
detect and prevent internal violations of law, and to model and then
mitigate the risks it is running in the course of its business. So long as
the regulator can identify what a good compliance system looks like and
determine whether the firm has one, and so long as the firm's
compliance outcomes fall within a range of permissible outcomes,
broadly defined, then the firm should be able to regulate itself within
those bounds. It should be able to devise its own systems - its own
processes for meeting the prescribed regulatory goals - with the
benefit of its fine-grained understanding of its own business.
This "regulation of self-regulation" approach was a
characteristic of some important regulatory initiatives in financial
regulation in the pre-crisis era. In fact, quite a lot of rhetoric at the time
suggested that more meta-regulatory, principles-based methods had the
potential to improve regulatory performance along all matrices at once.
This was not just a deregulatory or market fundamentalist project - it
was far more broad-based than that. For example, John Tiner, CEO of
5. Coglianese & Lazer, Management-Based Regulation, 37 LAw & Soc'Y REv 691,
691 (2003).
6. Cristie Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global
Financial Crisis, 55 McGILL L. J. 257 (2010).
7. PARKER, supra note 4.
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the U.K. Financial Services Authority during this era, said in 2006 that
principles-based regulation could produce simply "better" regulation,
which would mean simultaneously "(1) a stronger probability of
statutory outcomes being secured, (2) a lower cost, and (3) more
stimulus to competition and innovation all at once."8 (Note the
reference to stimulating innovation.) This was part of what was going
on in this time period.
Tiner's quote points to another way to understand our regulatory
choices in this time period, which really derives from the new
regulatory drive to be dynamic and context-sensitive, and to pull private
actors' own contextual knowledge into the regulatory process. An
important but under-examined factor is the relationship between
regulation and the phenomenon of private sector innovation. Flexible
regulation is built to function in the midst of constant change. Pulling in
contextual information from firms' matters because that information is
complex and constantly changing. Firms' internal compliance strategies
are of interest to regulators because firms know more about their fast-
moving businesses than regulators ever could. Regulators are seeking to
link to firms' internal compliance mechanisms, which in turn are trying
to keep up with business risks - and in financial firms, those business
risks were very often the constantly shifting byproduct of fast-moving
financial innovation. So, without consciously trying to, some regulatory
regimes of the meta-regulatory variety ultimately lost any purchase
from which to question private actors' for-profit innovations, and even
ended up embedding them into their very regulatory processes and
standards in an effort to create regulatory architecture that could channel
and keep up with that innovation.
In finance, the particular form of private sector innovation I'm
interested in really has to do with the disaggregation and recombination
of what were formerly tightly bundled bits of property, and therefore
risk. While flexible regulation appreciated the need to keep up with a
changing field, what it did not appreciate was just how profoundly
destabilizing that degree of innovation would be for regulation itself. It
8. John Tiner, Chief Executive, FSA, Speech at the SII Annual Conference: Better
Regulation: Objective or Oxymoron (May 9, 2006), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/0509jt.shtml; see also
Clive Briault, Managing Director, Retail Markets, FSA, Speech at ABI 2007 Conference:
Principles-Based Regulation - Moving from Theory to Practice (May 10, 2007), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2007/05 10_cb.shtml.
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was destabilizing to the boundaries of regulatory arenas and
destabilizing to some of the assumptions that underpinned regulatory
regimes.
In this talk, I point briefly to the Basel II Accords around capital
adequacy as an example of a meta-regulatory regime that embraced
private sector innovation and private ordering around it, without
appreciating how destabilizing that innovation actually was. A second
category of regulatory approaches to innovation are those that attempt
to establish boundaries and preconditions to innovation through a series
of parameters on the scope of the market. These strategies assume that
innovation can be contained, and that within pre-set boundaries the
market can be counted on to produce predictable and manageable sorts
of innovation outcomes. This is mistaken too. In this second category
would fall the securities law regime around asset-backed commercial
paper ("ABCP") in Canada, and there are similar mechanisms in the
United States. A third category would include older regulatory
structures that do not actually try to respond to the impact of innovation
in the same conscious way, but nevertheless are affected by it. Notice
and comment rulemaking under the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act,
particularly around the so-called Volcker Rule, is my example here.
I use the term "innovation framing regulation" to try to
foreground the relationship between regulatory structure and private
sector innovation. This helps demonstrate that the failure to appreciate
the nature and significance of privately generated innovation, within the
regulatory regimes designed to work with that innovation, was really an
important factor in regulatory failure leading up to the financial crisis.
Structures like the Basel II capital adequacy regime were premised on
the conviction that private sector innovation was inevitably and
appropriately going to be fast-moving and complex, so that regulators
only needed to steer (not row), and to channel this fast moving force at
the systems level, without actually having to understand it in any
detailed way.
Thinking about regulation in terms of its innovation framing
qualities also allows us to question the sense, within regulation and
regulatory scholarship, that it is actually possible through regulatory
technique to channel and harness private sector innovation in public
welfare-enhancing directions - to tweak incentives here and bring in
private standards there, and thereby build a system that will generate
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predictable, positive outcomes out of industry-driven change. I think
there was considerable overconfidence about the capacity of good meta-
level regulatory design to achieve "simply better" results in all
directions, and inattention to the broader context in which regulation
was located. There was also a crucial failure to recognize the feedback
loop between regulatory structure and private sector innovation itself.
Innovation and regulation are in a reflexive relationship. Regulation
constitutes its environment, its regulatory field, the market. If you
constitute an environment based on the sense that private sector
innovation will inevitably be a fast moving, complex, fundamentally
beneficial thing, and that all that regulators really need to do is to try not
to fall too far behind or get in the way, then you will have an
environment in which innovation will have a license to accelerate and
regulators will not have a principled basis on which to challenge it.
Bourdieu and other scholars of power would point to the
influence of a form of large-scale cognitive capture in this story.9 There
is a broader, contemporary social and political conversation that really
sees innovation as ultimately beneficial, supremely important, and not
something that regulation should be obstructing. Whether we think of it
as capture or not, a pro-innovation worldview affected many of the
regulatory structures we are looking at in this time - whether they
were consciously innovation-framing, like Basel II, or whether they
were operating in the context of a broader political conversation around
the Volcker Rule. What that background pro-innovation consensus did
in the Volcker Rule context was to limit the political conversation at the
level of the legislative process, but it also meant that the conversation at
the level of the regulator would inevitably take place in highly technical
terms, which were not accessible to members of the public that wanted
to participate. The standard concerns that everybody has about public
input in the notice and comment rulemaking function are only
exacerbated when you are trying to have that conversation around
highly technical details, like those surrounding the Volcker Rule and its
implementation. I suggest that there has been a general failure to have
an important normative conversation about the trade-offs we are
making, when we put innovation in front and center among our
priorities. In my view it is unrealistic to think that we can transcend
9. PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOIc J.D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE
SoCIOLOGY (1992).
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some of the difficult, normatively contested issues that underlie
financial regulation just through better regulatory technique.
Basel II is my specific example of a meta-regulatory structure.' 0
Basel II incorporates clear meta-regulatory elements and typifies the
outcome-oriented, principles-based turn that financial regulation took
between about 2002 and 2008. Basel II tried to improve on Basel I
through its three pillar strategy. Pillar 1 imposed a minimal capital
requirement. Pillar 2 provided for financial institution supervision by
national bank supervisors, and Pillar 3 imposed enhanced disclosure
requirements. The idea behind Pillar 3 was to try to activate market
forces to buttress the capital adequacy requirements, on the assumption
that better-informed market participants would decide whether or not to
buy your product. Under Pillar 1, the largest financial institutions were
allowed to use a so-called "advanced approach" to capital adequacy.
Essentially they were allowed, within limits, to use their internal,
proprietary risk modeling software to assess the risks associated with
the products they were carrying and marketing, and therefore to
determine for themselves how much capital they had to keep on hand.
Of course, as it turned out, this promoted a behavioral cascade toward
excessive risk taking, which was exacerbated by the failure of proper
supervision by some national regulators under Pillar 2. The Pillar 3
market discipline idea did not work either. Disclosure does not work if,
in spite of the disclosure, market participants cannot understand the
product, and disclosure does not work well during a bubble. The failure
of all three of those Pillars really could be understood, in part, as a
function of the unanticipated disruptive impact of private sector
innovation on a structure designed to deal with it.
The summer 2007 ABCP crisis in Canada" was not globally
significant in terms of impact, but it is an interesting regulatory case
study to illustrate a second category of innovation framing regulatory
strategy. The ABCP crisis in Canada foreshadowed some of the
financial crisis events that happened later, and it was similar in nature.
Commercial paper is a short term (less than 270 days), unsecured IOU.
10. See THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, www.bis.org (last visited Oct.
11,2013).
11. See John Chant, The ABCP Crisis in Canada: The Implications for the Regulation
of Financial Markets, A Research Study Prepared For the Expert Panel on Securities
Regulation, http://www.expertpanel.ca/documents/research-
studies/The%20ABCP%20Crisis%20in%20Canada%20-%20Chant.English.pdf
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"Asset backed" commercial paper is commercial paper secured by an
underlying asset. Under Canadian securities laws, commercial paper
could be sold under an exemption from the normal disclosure
obligations associated with securities regulation, on the belief that it was
extremely safe.12 There were four reasons it was assumed to be safe.
The first was that it was assumed that no rational investor would buy
commercial paper, that is, basically an unsecured IOU, from anything
other than a reputable organization. There would be no market for
commercial paper issued by some fly-by-night entity. Thus, the
marketability of the product itself was an indication of its safety. As
well, commercial paper matures after only 270 days. The likelihood that
a reputable organization would suffer some kind of default event within
270 days would be minimal. Third, the commercial paper had to receive
an approved rating from an approved credit rating agency, which would
vouch for its soundness. Finally, like the products sold in the rest of the
exempt market, the idea was that commercial paper would only be sold
to sophisticated investors who did not need the disclosure the securities
regulation regime would otherwise provide.
Each of those assumptions proved to be flawed, and I argue that
they were flawed largely as a function of the impact of innovation. First,
the fact that ABCP was marketable bore no relationship to its safety as
an investment. ABCP was actually issued by conduits that had been
created by banks, and the banks used those conduits to move long-term
credit obligations off their own balance sheets. So, there was no
relationship there (at least on paper, and before reputational forces
kicked in). You were not actually buying blue chip stock from the Royal
Bank of Canada. It was highly marketable, especially internationally,
primarily because it offered a better return than a lot of other
investments did. Second, the short 270 day window was irrelevant
because the entire ABCP market was constantly being rolled over.
Maturing ABCP was paid out using new ABCP. It operated like a short-
term credit facility. ABCP was only going to be a meaningful
instrument so long as it could continually be rolled over. What
happened in the ABCP crisis was that parties became nervous about the
12. See Paula Toovey & John Kiff, Developments and Issues In The Canadian Market for
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper, THE FIN. SYS. REVIEW (2012),
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/fsr-0603-toovey.pdf.
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assets underlying some ABCP, and particularly about whether some
Canadian ABCP was exposed to U.S. subprime mortgage debt. It
became harder to roll ABCP over and ultimately the market froze
completely. So the 270 day window was not a meaningful timeframe.
Third, credit rating agencies were not effective assessors of product
quality.' 3 Finally, purchasers of ABCP were not always sophisticated
investors. A lot of retail investors owned ABCP as part of managed
portfolios. Each of these fundamental assumptions about the asset-
backed commercial paper market was undermined as a function of the
kind of smashing of the atom of property that was effected by private
sector innovation around derivatives and securitization.
Regarding the Volcker Rule in the United States, I rely
substantially on Kim Krawiec's wonderful piece, Don 't "Screw Joe the
Plummer [sic]": The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform.14 What I
argue, extrapolating from her account, is that there was no possibility of
having a really meaningful conversation at the political level around
limiting private sector innovation in finance. As a result, the Volcker
Rule and decisions about how it would be implemented fell to the
regulators. This turned it into a highly technical conversation. Krawiec's
work does a wonderful job of cataloging and analyzing the thousands of
letters written by members of the public to the FSOC and other
regulators around the Volcker Rule. Largely, these letters from the
public made emotional or political pleas - they said things like "don't
screw Joe the plummer" - meanwhile, financial industry members
were having one-on-one meetings with top regulators, writing cogent
letters about technical matters, and providing the kind of input that
could actually move the needle in terms of how the rule would be
implemented.
These three examples suggest three misperceptions around the
impact of innovation and regulation that deserve more attention. While
obviously each of these case studies is different, in each one the
regulatory regime exhibits a lack of understanding about the
phenomenon of innovation that it is grappling with.
The first assumption we need to examine is that the role of
13. Although in Canada, a Canadian credit rating agency blew the whistle and hastened
the crisis.
14. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don't "Screw Joe the Plummer": The Sausage-Making of
Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. R. 55-103 (2013).
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regulators is simply to get out of the way of fast moving, complex
financial innovation, which (as the U.K.'s Turner Review suggested) is
assumed to be beneficial virtually by definition.15 Whether regulators
are trying to get out of the way through high level meta-regulatory
architecture (as with Basel II) or by ceding the field to the market (as
with the ABCP regime), a consequential underlying idea was that
regulators needed to regulate from a greater distance to account for the
beneficial, unstoppable, massively complex force of innovation that was
operating. This enforced humility on the part of regulators (or was it
complacency about the rationality and wisdom of markets and market
actors, and optimism about regulatory technique?) really meant that in
the run-up to the financial crisis, private sector bankers' quantitative
skills were understood to be more central than larger policy
conversations. This left broader social questions about the nature and
implications of innovation - who is innovating? for what purposes?
with what larger consequences? - substantially insulated from
interrogation. The perception that financial innovation was going to be
beneficial overall meant that it was virtually impossible for regulators to
articulate concerns, or even to have concerns, about, for example, the
growth of the over-the-counter derivatives market. They no longer
considered it their role to ask these sorts of broader, normative
questions. This regulatory stance, while not intentionally deregulatory,
prohibited proper examination of the kinds of varieties of innovations
and the purposes they served. I would suggest, as well, that though the
default assumption that financial innovation is beneficial has been
challenged since the financial crisis, as scholars of regulation we have
still not undertaken the kind of careful inquiry into the nature of
innovation that is needed, if we are to design more effective regulation
going forward.
The second assumption challenged by these three narratives is
that the regulatory moment is the crucial one. Of course I think
regulatory structure matters or I would not be a scholar of regulation,
but we may also need to broaden our view to include the moments
before and behind the regulatory moment, where the atom of property is
being smashed through financial innovation, as well as developments
after the highest-profile regulatory moments as demonstrated, for
15. Fin. Servs. Auth., The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking
crisis (Mar. 2009), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner-review.pdf.
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example, in the Volcker Rule rulemaking process. At this later stage we
need to ask ourselves who is still in the room in the subsequent
moments where the fundamental details of rule implementation actually
get determined? Focusing only on the formal regulatory moment misses
the broader temporal landscape that affects regulators' scope for action
at that point, and beyond.
Third, we need to question the assumption that regulation
somehow sits outside innovation and is not directly implicated by it. It
is not the case that we can design elegant regulatory architecture that
will be impervious to the highly destabilizing forces of innovation on
the ground. The reflexive relationship between innovation framing
regulatory architecture, and innovation, is significant and demands more
study. I am not saying that we should return to bright line, old style, top
down, traditional rulemaking on a large scale. Innovation has shown
itself to be very adept at getting around bright line rules, which is one of
the reasons that flexible and principles-based regulation emerged in the
first place. There is no putting the genie back in the bottle now. At the
same time, we need to appreciate how disruptive innovation can be to
regulation, and in particular how it can pry open unexpected spaces
within a regulatory regime, through which some parties' interests are
advanced at the expense of others.
At a technical level, effective regulation of private sector
innovation requires a clearer and more nuanced understanding of
innovation than it currently has - a better sense of how and for whose
purposes innovation develops; and of what effects innovation might
have on regulation itself. However, we should not imagine that there
will be some magical step change in regulatory technique that will
harness private sector innovation without tradeoffs, that will avoid hard
normative choices, or that can make everyone happy at once. The
regulation of financial sector innovation in recent years in no way
counts as successful if what we care about is transparency,
accountability, or the bending of the arc of private innovation toward
greater social benefit than the market can produce on its own. I hope
that thinking about financial regulation in terms of its innovation-
framing qualities will help us chart a clearer path forward.
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